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Devin Vaughn
Slavery as a Political Tool: The Battle over Kansas
The decades leading to the Civil War were marked by an 
increase in political combat between the North and the South over 
the question of slavery. Territorial expansion and the admittance 
of new states greatly intensified this battle, causing legislators to 
argue over the question of whether or not slavery would be allowed 
to continue westward. In the decade preceding the Civil War, the 
struggle over the admission of Kansas as a state embodied the 
South’s attempts to utilize the institution of slavery as a political tool 
to aid in this battle. Southern political forces went to great lengths 
in their attempt to admit Kansas as a slave state, hoping that the 
newly created state would increase the South’s political potency. 
There is much to be considered when defining the “South,” 
given its geographic, economic, political, and cultural diversity. 
This paper will utilize slavery as a means of determining southern 
identity, because the institution had geographic, economic, 
political, and cultural implications. The official slave states by 1860 
were Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.1 These fifteen states were 
what comprised the South as a factional entity.
Comparatively, the North was a less united entity. Its free 
workforce was a less systematized economic configuration and 
therefore required less centralization. As a result, the formation 
of the North as its own entity was due less to a uniting internal 
aspect, like slavery, and more to a reaction against an external 
aspect; the South’s political prowess. The official free states by 
1860 were California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
and Wisconsin.2 These eighteen states were what comprised the 
North as a factional entity.
An important factor in comparing the South and the North is 
the breakdown of their populations and how those populations 
were represented in Congress. The Three-Fifths Compromise, 
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which allowed three out of every five slaves to be factored into 
the population represented in Congress, was established at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787 and allowed the lesser populated 
slaves states to stand up against the North’s superior population; 
and, for many years, the Three-Fifths Compromise leveled the 
sectional playing field in Congress.3 Unfortunately for southern 
interests, the North’s population grew at a far greater rate. 
In 1790, the South had a total population of 1,961,372 people 
(free and enslaved), while the North had a population of 1,968,455 
people.4 But following the War of 1812, millions of immigrants 
poured into the country, most of them into northern port cities 
like New York and Boston. Meanwhile, many Americans in both 
the South and the North moved westward into the territories, 
which was a concern for the South, because its population was 
not being replenished by European immigration.5 As a result, 
by 1850, the South was populated by 9,612,769 people (free and 
enslaved), while the North was populated by 13,434,922 people. 
When one detracts the value of the South’s 3,200,304 slaves, its 
free population is revealed to have been 6,412,465; but in terms of 
political representation, as a result of the Three-Fifths Compromise, 
approximately 1,920,182 of the slaves were counted as freemen, 
giving the South an adjusted free population of 8,332,647 people. 
In comparing the South’s adjusted free population to the North’s 
population, one finds that the North still had 5,102,275 more people 
than the South in 1850. That difference represented roughly sixty-
one percent of the South’s adjusted free population. Without the 
Three-Fifths Compromise, the difference would have been roughly 
110 percent. However, despite the North’s far greater populace, the 
South stretched over more land, occupying 851,448 square miles, 
while the North occupied 612,597 square miles, meaning the South 
controlled roughly fifty-eight percent of the total area of the United 
States, excluding the territories.6 
The Three-Fifths Compromise would also greatly alter the 
Electoral College. In 1852, the South had 120 electoral votes, and 
the North had 176 electoral votes. Had the electoral votes not taken 
into account three-fifths of the slaves, the numbers would have 
been 105 and 191, respectively, thus giving the North even greater 
representation.7 One can clearly see the political advantage the 
Three-Fifths Compromise afforded the South.
Even with this advantage, the North still would have politically 
overpowered the South much earlier had the political system 
predating the presidential election of 1860 been purely sectional. 
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Fortunately for southern interests, the political system since the 
time of John Adams’ presidency had been a non-sectional two-party 
system, with various political parties taking active, dualistic roles. 
As a result of the non-sectional party system, sectional issues were 
less troublesome because voters could channel their sectional anger 
into a less divisive, non-sectional system capable of compromise.8 
From 1836 to 1852, the Whig-Democrat party system dominated 
presidential politics.9 It was under this system that the Slave Power 
would have its last era of dominance, being able to manipulate the 
party system in its favor.
The term “Slave Power” is used in this paper to describe an oligarchy 
of slaveholders who acted in varying forms of unison to control state 
and national politics to favor their interests. The idea of such a class of 
men in the United States, trying to limit federal power to favor their 
own interests, had existed since the debate over the ratification of the 
Constitution in 1787. Alexander Hamilton, in advocating ratification, 
wrote of such men, stating their intentions to limit the power of the 
federal government and describing their desire as:
the perverted ambition of another class of men, who 
will either hope to aggrandise [sic] themselves by the 
confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves 
with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision 
of the empire into several partial confederacies, than 
from its union under one government.10
Though Hamilton did not specifically name the “Slave Power,” he 
outlined its objective: to make itself more powerful at the cost of the 
federal government. 
In 1850, the number of slaveholders in the South was 346,048; 
and, of that number, 92,215 owned ten or more slaves. This was a 
rather small figure in relation to the overall size of the South, but the 
influence of this class was great. Furthermore, the majority of the 
South’s economy was derived from agriculture. In 1850, the value 
of the South’s agricultural product was $631,277,417, whereas the 
value of the product of its manufactures was $165,413,027. In the 
field of agriculture, 3,697,649 people were employed; of that figure, 
2,500,000 of them were slaves. This means that sixty-eight percent 
of those who worked in the most profitable field of the southern 
economy were slaves.11 Consequently, slaveholders controlled 
more than two-thirds of the workforce in the largest sector of the 
South’s economy. This figure taken separately (assuming that each 
agricultural worker produced the same amount of product) was 
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larger than the remainder of the value of the agricultural product 
combined with the value of the industrial product. When one 
combines the data of the agricultural and industrial products, 
slaveholders employed in agriculture were directly responsible for 
at least fifty-three percent of the South’s overall economic product, 
meaning that the slaveholders were clearly the most important 
figures in the South’s economy. 
Another important factor in determining the influence of 
slaveholders can be found in data concerning how political discourse 
might have been circulated. Census data relating to urbanization, 
education, the press, and transportation gives a context to the Slave 
Power’s potential to control the southern populace. 
Given the lack of an accessible national media, local institutions 
influenced most voters.12 In the South, most institutions of political 
influence were fewer and more disparate than in the North. 
Cities, for example, were important cultural centers for circulating 
political debate; but the South was home to very few large cities. 
In fact, in 1856, census data revealed that there was “less than fifty 
cities with a population of 3,500” in the South.13 This meant that 
southerners were less likely to have strong, nearby cultural centers 
of political discourse. In relation to education, a strong means by 
which political debate is advanced, the South had only 18,507 
public schools to the North’s 62,433; and only 152 public libraries 
to the North’s 1,058. Illiteracy was also high in the South. In 1850, 
512,882 illiterate white people lived in the South, or roughly seven 
percent of the total white population, assuming that the figure 
representing the number of slaves in the total population remained 
constant. Also, in 1850, there were 454 political periodicals in the 
South with a circulation of 413,265 (a figure very close to the number 
of slaveholders.) Comparatively, the North had 1,160 political 
periodicals with a circulation of 1,394,582. And another important 
means of circulating political discourse was transportation. In 1854, 
the South had 4,212 miles of railroads to the North’s 13,105, and 
1,116 miles of canals to the North’s 3,682.14
If one takes all of this information together, one can see that 
the methods by which political discourse was circulated in the 
South were minimal and more likely to have been controlled by 
regional influences, giving much more power to local leaders. Since 
slaveholders controlled the largest portion of the economy, it can be 
reasonably assumed that they were able to take advantage of their 
influential positions and guide their regional masses in a manner 
that would have been less imaginable in the North.
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By whatever method, though representing only a small fraction 
of the population, slaveholders and their interests were well 
represented in government. In the executive branch, between the 
presidencies of Thomas Jefferson and James Monroe, the state 
of Virginia held sway over the presidency for nearly a quarter 
century; and, prior to the presidency of Abraham Lincoln, the only 
presidents to ever serve more than one term (Washington, Jefferson, 
Madison, Monroe, and Jackson) were slaveholders. In addition, of 
the fifteen presidents before Lincoln, nine of them were from the 
South. Many more slaveholders served in Congress, including 
those who served as Speaker of the House the longest (Henry Clay, 
Andrew Stevenson, and Nathaniel Macon.) In the judicial branch, 
the South maintained a strong advantage, as nineteen of the thirty-
four Supreme Court Justices before Lincoln were slaveholders.15 
Considering the South’s relatively small population when compared 
to the North, one would assume that the South would not have had 
such clout in government, but the South was able to maintain great 
power preceding the Civil War because of its political savvy. 
The South’s ability to maintain its strength existed in its ability 
to manipulate northerners. On May 26, 1854, William Seward, a 
Whig senator from New York, addressed the Senate regarding the 
upcoming passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. He spoke of the 
South’s ability to maintain its power:
The great support of Slavery in the South has been 
its alliance with the Democratic Party of the North. 
By means of that alliance it obtained paramount 
influence in this Government about the year 1800 
which, from that time to this, with but few and slight 
interruptions, it has maintained.16
The Democratic Party, since the time of Andrew Jackson, 
required a presidential candidate to have the backing of at least 
a two-thirds majority of the nominating caucus; and because the 
South was such an integral element of the party, it would have been 
impossible for a Democratic presidential candidate to receive the 
party’s backing if he were at odds with the South. Consequently, if 
a northern Democrat were to have any hope of success in the party, 
he would have to back the southern agenda.17 As a result, the South 
more or less controlled the Democratic Party on the national level. 
This organization allowed the South to always fend off threats 
in Congress. For example, if a bill were presented to Congress 
opposing the interests of the Slave Power, its un-amended passage 
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would have been highly unlikely, given that opposition to the bill 
would have included the entire South (both Whigs and Democrats) 
and the northern wing of the Democratic Party. In fact, for many 
years, the only real opposition to the South as a whole was northern 
Whigs.
This acquiescence, on the part of northern Democrats, made 
possible the passage of such bills catering to southern interests 
as the admission of Arkansas as a slave state in 1819, the Indian 
Removal Act of 1830, and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. As time 
wore on, however, the South found it more difficult to rely on 
support from northern Democrats because their staunch support 
for the South caused them to lose elections. Meanwhile, some 
northern Democrats felt that they were not adequately profiting 
from their support for the South since northerners could seldom 
gain a great deal of power in the Democratic Party.18 Consequently, 
by the time the Kansas-Nebraska Bill came to Congress in 1854, 
the South was in a politically weaker position than it had been in 
previous decades.
The admittance of new states had long been a difficult subject 
in antebellum politics. For many years preceding the Civil War, 
the number of slave states had remained equal to the number of 
free states. If a new slave state was admitted, it was coupled with a 
new free state, and vice versa. For example, Alabama offset Illinois; 
Missouri offset Maine; and Arkansas offset Michigan. By this 
method, a certain level of sectional equality was maintained in the 
Senate.19
This delicate balance, however, would be undone. As a result 
of the gold rush of 1849, many Americans flocked to California in 
search of wealth. The influx of so many people required a territorial 
government, and Californians drew up a constitution prohibiting 
slavery. Many of those mining gold wanted to keep slavery out of 
California, due to racism and fear that slaveholders would take 
over the mining industry as they had the agricultural industry in 
the South. As a result, California was admitted as a free state in 
1850.20
The admittance of California destroyed the balance between 
the South and the North in the Senate. Consequently, as the 1850s 
began, there were fifteen slave states and sixteen free states, 
meaning the balance in the Senate was thirty and thirty-two, 
respectively.21 Though the South could often count on the votes 
of northern Democrats, the idea of this new imbalance prompted 
efforts to reestablish balance in the Senate.
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Meanwhile, in the early 1850s, Congress was pressured to 
officially organize the remainder of the Louisiana Purchase to 
allow for settlers. Stephen A. Douglas, a Democratic senator 
from Illinois serving as the chairman of the Senate Committee on 
Territories, brought forward a bill in early 1854 organizing the 
territories of Kansas and Nebraska. Prior to this bill, the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820 had been used to determine the expansion 
of slavery in the territories. The Compromise stated that slavery 
would not be allowed in the territories north of the 36°30’ parallel 
line (the southern border of Missouri.) This statute was intended 
as a concession to the South from the North, but more than three 
decades after its passage, the Slave Power was no longer satisfied. 
In a move to draw southern Democratic support, Douglas 
overturned the Compromise of 1820 with his new bill, the Kansas-
Nebraska Act, which voided the 36°30’ parallel line and stipulated 
that the people of the territories would decide for themselves 
the question of slavery via popular sovereignty. As a result of 
overturning the longstanding Compromise of 1820, the Kansas-
Nebraska Act would prove to be very divisive. Many southerners 
welcomed the bill because it potentially opened up the West for 
slavery, but many northerners found in it more reason to reaffirm 
their belief in the existence of the Slave Power controlling national 
affairs.22
When William Seward addressed the Senate in late May of 1854, 
he had no illusions about the outcome of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. 
Referencing the bill’s approaching passage, he lamented, “The sun 
has set for the last time upon the guarantied [sic] and certain liberties 
of all the unsettled and unorganized portions of the American 
continent that lie within the jurisdiction of the United States.” He 
went on to point at the “political equilibrium between the free and 
the slave States,” indicating that the bill could destroy it, giving the 
South more power and influence over the North. Though Seward’s 
opening statements seem particularly dejected from a northern 
perspective, his tone would change when speaking of the future.23
Fear is what Seward described as the motivating factor in the 
South’s support of the Kansas-Nebraska Act: “Slavery, wherever 
it exists, begets fear, and fear is the parent of weakness. . . . It is 
the apprehension that, even if safe now, they [the slave states] 
will not always or long be secure against some invasion or some 
aggression from the free States.” A primary factor in the fear 
described by Seward was the increasing political potency of the 
North. As aforementioned, by 1850, the North’s population was 
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greater than the South’s adjusted free population by 5,102,275 
people which figures to be sixty-one percent of the South’s adjusted 
free population. Seward cited European immigration as being a 
primary factor in this force of population that would eventually 
make slavery obsolete.24
Earlier that same year, in the House, the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
was dividing some southern congressman, sparking disagreements 
over the meaning of the 1820 Missouri Compromise. Alexander 
H. Stephens, a Democratic congressman from Georgia, stated 
that the 1820 Compromise had been only a compact between the 
federal government and the state of Missouri, and that the slavery-
prohibiting effect of the 36°30’ parallel line did not stretch outside 
of Missouri, meaning that slavery was free to be established in 
any of the United States’ territories. He also stated that the North 
did not respect the line, as many northern congressmen voted 
against the admission of Arkansas as a slave state, even though 
it fell below the line. Citing what he implied to be hypocrisy 
and dishonesty on the North’s part, he felt that the South had no 
obligation to respect the Compromise of 1820. He went further to 
identify the northern threat. His reasoning implied, if the North 
could legislate slavery out of the territories, it could possibly do 
the same to the South in the future, should it gain the political 
support of the new states. He made clear his desire to give slavery 
a chance in the West via popular sovereignty.25
Theodore G. Hunt, a Whig congressman from Louisiana, 
refuted some of Stephens’s claims in his speech. He stated that the 
repeal of the Missouri Compromise of 1820 would be a dangerous 
precedent. It would destroy the good faith in the negotiations and 
compromises made previously between the South and the North. 
He also stated that the Missouri Compromise was a “southern 
measure carried by southern votes,” in that many southerners 
voted in its favor, it respected southern interests, and it created 
peace between the South and the North. Ultimately, the negation of 
the Compromise would potentially make any laws or agreements 
on the books in relation to slavery open to repeal.26
With this in mind, Hunt said, “And now, I would ask, what 
motive has the South to extend the area of slavery within the 
present limits of the Republic?” Hunt had stated that much of 
the western territory was unsuitable for southern cash crops that 
had been used to warrant slavery in the first place. “Why then,” 
he continued, “this lust for new lands not wanted and not capable 
of being used?” Hunt would answer his own question: “There 
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are those who desire that the slaveholding States should acquire 
additional territory, in the belief or hope of effecting and preserving 
a balance or equilibrium between them and the non-slaveholding 
States. But this is a vain and delusive hope.”27
Hunt’s assertions implied that the Slave Power sought to 
continue slavery into new areas of the country, where much of 
the land would not be hospitable to the institution, for the sake of 
political gain. In much of the western territory, slavery would not 
have been of value economically as much as it would have been 
politically because once slavery was imbedded in a state, that 
state’s society would come to generally revolve around it, therein 
creating an increase in power and influence for slaveholders. As a 
result, slavery created a comparatively centralized political system 
by means of a collective interest based around slaveholders that 
extended across all slave states. In this sense, the Slave Power was 
adverse to the South’s championed system of politics: states’ rights.
Nineteenth-century historian Henry Adams explained the 
actions of the Slave Power in relation to its supposed support of 
states’ rights:
Whenever a question arose of extending or protecting 
slavery, the slaveholders became friends of cen-
tralized power, and used that dangerous weapon 
with a kind of frenzy. Slavery in fact required 
centralization in order to maintain and protect it-
self, but it required to control a centralized machine; 
it needed despotic principles of government, but it 
needed them exclusively for its own use.28
Had states’ rights been the real issue in southern politics, 
Douglas would not have opposed the Mormon settlers’ sanctioning 
of polygamy in the Utah territory, given the fact it was the popular 
decision of the citizens of that territory.29 Also, the South’s passage of 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which more or less forced northerners 
to participate in catching fugitive slaves, was hardly an example of 
states’ rights, seeing as it forced northerners to support laws they 
did not endorse. In short, southern politics did not operate on the 
idea of states’ rights; it operated on the idea of what was best for 
the Slave Power.
In 1856, the Democratic Party tried to put a bill through 
Congress bringing in Kansas as a state under the aegis of popular 
sovereignty; that is, allowing the people of the state to decide on 
the issue of slavery. However, as the southern rhetoric developed, 
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it highlighted the importance of slavery to the South more than it 
championed the idea of states’ rights. In the bill, the Democrats 
deferred guilt on the issue of slavery by stating, “We shall not 
undertake to determine why the God of nature made the African 
inferior to the white man; or why He permitted England to fasten 
the institution of slavery upon the colonies against their repeated 
and earnest remonstrances.” They then added that any attempt by 
the government to revoke slavery would be in opposition to the 
Constitution and the political system of states’ rights which the 
Democrats implied was the modus operandi from the nation’s 
beginning.30 In this argument, the South covered its real intent to 
expand slavery and shrouded its arguments with support for the 
Constitution and states’ rights, as well as economic factors.
Conversely, John Allison, a Whig congressman from 
Pennsylvania, attacked the bill and spoke of the question of 
slavery’s expansion:
I represent a constituency whom to say nothing of the 
question of humanity, are interested in this question 
— interested because it is the overshadowing 
moneyed interest of this country — controlling 
its Government, dictating its legislation. The vast 
amount of capital invested in slave property, together 
with other causes, renders it the most vigilant and 
sensitive interest ever known to any country.
He would continue to denounce the expansion of slavery 
as an economic and political weight on the country, as well as a 
moral weight, adverse to the nation’s principles.31 His statements 
recognized the political expediency of slavery and how its westward 
expansion would have further affected national politics.
James A. Stewart, a Democratic congressman from Maryland, 
through supporting slavery and its westward expansion, verified 
its strong influence on the economy and politics. He stated, “Such 
a scheme [abolition] would be utterly destructive to the negro race, 
and in its results would occasion a fearful paralysis in all departments 
of trade everywhere, from which, galvanism, nor all the restoratives 
within reach, could save you.” Stewart then tried to turn the tables on 
the North by stating that the South and the West were natural allies, 
capable of making the North obsolete. By Stewart’s implication, the 
North was fearful and dependent of the South.32
Stewart’s implications were weakened by Judah P. Benjamin, a 
Democratic senator from Louisiana, who maintained an aura of fear 
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in regards to the North. Benjamin focused more upon the political 
advantages the North would have if Kansas were simply allowed 
to be a free state, theorizing that the North would eventually be 
able to take a decisive political majority and alienate the South from 
power. He stressed the necessity of keeping a political balance:
Sir, in every case where the framers of the 
constitution foresaw any temptation which could 
induce a majority from one section of the Union to 
legislate for their own exclusive advantage, they 
have expressly prohibited such an abuse in order to 
preserve equality between the States.
He continued by stating that the majority of the South’s 
economy was agricultural and that slaves formed the majority of 
the agricultural workforce. If slavery were to be excluded from 
the territories, the South would be economically castrated there. 
Benjamin then identified what he thought to be the reason behind 
the North’s refusal to adopt the bill:
The motive is a struggle for power — for political 
power — for the chance of subverting that equality 
of the States to which I have adverted . . . The 
object is to attain such power as shall put these 
parties in possession of sufficient representation, 
in both branches of Congress, to change the 
federal constitution, and to deprive the South of 
that representation which is already inadequate to 
protect her rights. 33
When looking back over the statements of the legislators in 
relation to this bill, it is interesting to note how much of the focus 
was upon slavery, its importance to the South, and the ramifications 
of its prohibition in the West, as opposed to what was supposed 
to be the official issue behind the bill: states’ rights. The southern 
legislators glossed over the idea of states’ rights, veering their 
arguments more toward protecting slavery, determinedly focusing 
on its expansion. As aforementioned, the South was less concerned 
with states’ rights and popular sovereignty, focusing on issues more 
immediate to the Slave Power. 
The bill failed to pass. By the time the Democrats tried to push 
it through Congress in 1856, the United States’ political climate 
had changed. The old non-sectional Whig-Democrat party system 
was on its last legs. Replacing the Whigs in the two-party system 
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were the Republicans; and in the presidential election of 1856, it 
was made clear that the Whig party was a thing of the past. The 
Democratic candidate, James Buchanan, won the election, scoring 
45.3 percent of the popular vote with a total of nineteen states in 
his pocket and 174 electoral votes; the Republican candidate, John 
C. Frémont, scored 33.1 percent of the popular vote with a total of 
eleven states in his pocket and 114 electoral votes; and the Whig-
American candidate, Millard Filmore, scored only 21.5 percent 
of the popular vote with only one state in his pocket and eight 
electoral votes.34
Though the Democrats decisively won the election, the results 
must have seemed very troubling. Prior to this election, the party 
system had not been sectional, and the election returns never 
implied one section of the country was at war with the other. 
Conversely, the returns of the presidential election of 1856 were 
very sectional. The entire South, with the exception of Maryland, 
went to Buchanan; while the North, with the exception of Illinois, 
Indiana, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, went to Frémont.35
The fears expressed by so many southern politicians had come 
true. The North, with its vastly superior population, had begun 
to organize itself politically. If things were to continue along this 
path, many southerners must have thought that the South would 
be politically overshadowed by the North, ultimately ostracized 
from power. The South responded in desperation, trying again to 
politicize the West in its favor by installing slavery as a permanent 
institution. This time, the doctrine of states’ rights was not even 
used to mask the intentions of the Slave Power.
In 1858, President Buchanan was determined to bring Kansas 
into the Union as a slave state. He attempted to push a bill through 
Congress to admit Kansas as a state based upon the Lecompton 
Constitution, a constitution written and ratified by a group of 
proslavery men largely unrepresentative of the entire populace, 
many of whom came from Missouri.36 This constitution stated 
that the government “shall have no power to pass laws for the 
emancipation of slaves without the consent of the owners,” and 
it also stated that the government would have no power to block 
immigrants to the state who were slaveholders.37 This attempt 
represented a complete breakdown of the previous southern 
rhetoric supporting states’ rights.
In the House of Representatives, William Porcher Miles, a 
Democrat from South Carolina, stated forthright that the issue 
of the new bill to admit Kansas as a state had nothing to do with 
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popular sovereignty. He said, “The mind of the whole country 
has been long distracted by this slavery agitation. It has entered 
into every political question and it is impossible to disguise the 
fact that it constitutes the very pith and substance of the contest in 
which we are engaged.” Miles did not even seek to deny the fraud 
surrounding the Lecompton Constitution; instead, he affirmed 
them, even implying the coordinated efforts of slave states, led by 
Missouri, to flood Kansas with proslavery men. He defended cries 
of foul play from the North by stating, “The question of frauds is 
a minor one.” He reasoned that the real necessity was to maintain 
a political equilibrium between the South and the North.38 With 
Minnesota and Oregon on the verge of being admitted as free states, 
Porcher was adamant that Kansas enter the Union as a slave state to 
keep the South a politically active force.39
Conversely, Alexander H. Stephens did not affirm the alleged 
frauds of the Lecompton Constitution and maintained its legitimacy. 
He argued that the United States Constitution was not ratified by 
a popular vote, instead by a convention, thus giving legitimacy 
to the proslavery convention that had ratified the Lecompton 
Constitution. In making this argument, Stephens was abandoning 
the past justification of popular sovereignty to reveal the expansion 
of slavery to be the real agenda of the South.40
In accordance with Stephens, Trusten Polk, a Democratic 
senator from Missouri, denied any corruption in the Lecompton 
Constitution as well, stating that it was not necessary, given the 
large number of proslavery men in Kansas. In explaining the 
North’s opposition to the bill, Polk alleged that the Lecompton 
Constitution’s section legalizing slavery was the only reason that 
there was any controversy at all regarding the admittance of Kansas. 
His argument ignored the idea of popular sovereignty in the same 
manner as did Stephens.41 
James M. Mason, a Democratic senator from Virginia, argued 
that the North’s attempts to exclude slavery from the territories were 
an effort “to prevent the expansion of political power in the South.” 
His arguments did not deny any fraudulent activity, deferring 
the guilt of such allegations by claiming similar frauds occurred 
commonly across the country. In closing, Mason bargained the 
admission of Kansas as a slave state for the admission of Minnesota 
as a free state.42
The southern arguments for the admission of Kansas as a slave 
state betrayed the original justification of their argument: popular 
sovereignty. Both the debate over the Kansas-Nebraska Act and 
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the Democratic bill to admit Kansas as a state in 1856 attempted to 
put some focus on what was considered to be the popular will of 
the would-be citizens of Kansas. The 1858 bill, comparatively, had 
stripped itself of the façade of popular sovereignty and revealed 
itself to be the South’s expansionist agenda, utilizing slavery as its 
primary tool.
On the northern side of the argument, in his opening speech 
before the Senate, William H. Seward, who had become a Republican, 
gave no pretensions about popular sovereignty. He stated that 
the conflict “involves a dynastical struggle of two antagonistical 
systems, the labor of slaves and the labor of freemen, for mastery in 
the Federal Union. One of these systems partakes of an aristocratic 
character; the other is purely democratic.” The Slave Power, he 
stated, had controlled the government from the nation’s beginning 
but had begun to be replaced by the ascension of the North as a 
political entity. He concluded that all civilized nations of the world 
had abolished or were in the process of abolishing slavery; only 
the Democratic Party still clung to the institution.43 In his closing 
speech, Seward stated that the arguments in the House and Senate 
had “stripped [the Democrats] bare of all pretences of fairness in 
the exercise of maintaining [their] own avowed policy of popular 
sovereignty. [They] will go before the people . . . in the detested 
character of a party intervening for Slavery against Freedom.”44
Oliver A. Morse, a Republican congressman from New York, 
affirmed the idea of the South’s former political control of the North 
by stating, “It has been obvious that, for a long time, the national 
power has been kept from the North, not by the proper strength of 
those who kept it, but by political stratagem and management.” He 
continued by adding that the North was overtaking the South in 
political power and that this caused the South to worry unnecessarily; 
he added, “there is no contest by the North with the South, though 
the Southern people persist in assuming there is one.”45
John A. Bingham, a Republican congressman from Ohio, argued 
that the forces at work behind the bill to admit Kansas as a state 
under the Lecompton Constitution were organized and committed 
to slavery. He stated, “The President and his party not only endorse 
the Lecompton Constitution, but by argument, by entreaty, and by 
threat, seek to induce Congress to endorse it, and thereby give to it 
the sanction and force of law.” He continued by citing a claim by a 
southern senator that his state would secede, should the bill not be 
passed.46 Bingham’s arguments identify a political agenda at work 
in the Democratic Party to pass the bill.
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The North’s arguments, like the South’s, were stripped of all 
pretenses. They focused solely on the political nature of what 
was at hand: the South’s attempt to force slavery into Kansas as a 
means of keeping the South afloat in terms of political power. Their 
arguments also recognized that the North was in control politically, 
evidenced by the fact that the Lecompton Constitution did not pass 
with the approval of Congress. 
The 1850s had seen three major attempts made by the South 
to use slavery to politicize the West in its favor, starting with the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 and followed by the Democratic bill 
to admit Kansas as a state in 1856. The Democratic bill to admit 
Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution in 1858 was the most 
desperate and last major attempt made by the South to push 
slavery westward to increase the national influence of the Slave 
Power. By the time of the Lecompton Constitution, the South’s 
political dominance had been usurped by the North, which had 
organized under the Republican Party in response to the South’s 
apparent political prowess and control. It was the South’s failure 
to maintain its political superiority in the 1850s that led to a 
Republican presidential victory in 1860 and the resulting secession 
of a majority of the southern states, which triggered the Civil War.
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